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Abstract
Focusing on the cost-reducing motive behind the use of temporary agency employment,
this paper aims at providing a better theoretical understanding of the effects of temporary
agency work on the wage-setting process, trade unions’ rents, firms’ profits and employ-
ment. It is shown that trade unions may find it optimal to accept lower wages to prevent
firms from using temporary agency workers. Hence, the firms’ option to use agency work-
ers may affect wage setting also in those firms that only employ regular workers. However,
if firms decide to employ agency workers, trade union wage claims will increase for the
(remaining) regular workers. An intensive use of temporary agency workers in high-wage
firms may therefore be the cause and not the consequence of the high wage level in those
firms. Even though we assume monopoly unions that ascribe the highest possible wage-
setting power to the unions, the economic rents of trade unions decline because of the
firms’ option to use temporary agency work, whereas firms’ profits may increase.
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1 Introduction
Usually, trade unions put up strong resistance to the employment of temporary agency
workers and the perceived weakening of pay and labour standards.1 However, as pointed
out by Bo¨heim & Zweimu¨ller (2013), in a given ﬁrm it is not necessarily clear a priori
whether the trade union will oppose the employment of temporary agency workers. The
reason is that cost savings and increases in proﬁts could enable unions to extract higher
rents in ﬁrms that employ agency workers. The theoretical analysis in this paper sheds
more light on the question whether trade unions may proﬁt from the introduction of
temporary agency work or not. In more general terms, it will be analysed how trade unions
react to the ﬁrms’ option to employ temporary agency workers and how this change in
trade unions’ wage-setting behavior aﬀects ﬁrms’ proﬁts, unions’ rents, and employment.
As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst theoretical paper dealing with the impact of temporary
agency work on trade union wage setting.
Temporary agency work constitutes a tripartite relationship, in which a temporary
agency worker is employed by the temporary work agency and, by means of a commercial
contract, is hired out to perform work assignments at a client ﬁrm. In return, the client
ﬁrm has to pay a fee to the temporary work agency. In the following, temporary agency
workers are referred to as temporary workers or agency workers. During the past few
decades the share of agency workers in the total workforce has signiﬁcantly increased in
almost all OECD countries. Though the great recession starting in 2007 led to a cyclical
decline in temporary agency work, in many countries the agency work penetration rate
seems to resume its upwards trend. For example, from 1996 to 2011, the agency work
penetration rate increased from 0.9 to 1.6 percent in Europe (with a peak of 2 percent in
2007), from 0.5 to 1.5 percent in Japan (with a peak of 2.2 percent in 2008), whereas it
remained on the same level of 1.9 percent in the USA (with peaks of 2.2 percent in 2000
and 2005), see Ciett (2013).
1See, for example, Heery (2004) for the UK, Coe et al. (2009) for Australia and Olsen & Kalleberg
(2004) for Norway and the US.
1
Various motives are behind the use of temporary agency employment (see, for example,
Holst et al., 2010). Some motives have to do with the ﬁrm’s necessity to react to a
changing environment under uncertainty. In this case, temporary agency work is used as
a “ﬂexibility buﬀer”. For example, the demand for temporary workers may be induced by
the needs to adjust for workforce ﬂuctuations and staﬀ absences or to deal with greater
uncertainty about future output levels (see Houseman, 2001 and Ono & Sullivan, 2013).
Other motives are more of a strategic nature and have to do with the potential of using
temporary agency employment to cut wage costs and increase proﬁts. This strategic
motive is well documented in the empirical literature (see, for example, Mitlacher, 2007
and Jahn & Weber, 2012). The focus of our model is on this cost-reduction motive
behind the use of temporary agency employment and how this aﬀects the “eﬀective”
wage bargaining power of trade unions.
One of our results will be that the option to use agency workers may aﬀect wage setting
also in those ﬁrms that do not employ temporary agency workers. This is an important
result for at least two reasons. First, empirical studies may come to wrong conclusions if
they try to identify the wage eﬀects of temporary agency work by comparing wage levels
for regular workers in ﬁrms with and without temporary agency work. Second, though
the share of agency workers in the total workforce is only about two percent in many
OECD countries, the impact of temporary agency work on the wage-setting process may
be much larger.
From a methodological point of view, our theoretical model is related to papers dis-
cussing the impact of international outsourcing on trade union wage-setting. For example,
in Koskela & Scho¨b (2010) and Skaksen (2004) the ﬁrms’ option to outsource some part
of production dampens wage claims of trade unions. Lommerud et al. (2006) analyse how
international mergers might restrain the market power of unions in oligopoly markets. In
those papers, the outsourcing or merging option imposes a threat to the bargaining power
of trade unions, whereas in our paper the “eﬀective” bargaining power of trade unions is
eroded by the possibility to replace regular workers by temporary agency workers.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical
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framework and explains the components of the theoretical model. Section 3 derives the
labour demand functions for regular workers for two employment regimes. In one regime
only regular workers are used, whereas in the other regime agency workers are employed
as well. Section 4 analyses the wage-setting behaviour of trade unions when ﬁrms have
the option to also employ agency workers. It is shown that three wage-setting regimes
can be distinguished. Section 5 compares the levels of wages, employment, trade unions’
utilities and ﬁrm’s proﬁts for the three wage-setting regimes. Whereas the analysis in the
main text focuses on a closed economy, Section 6 shows that our results also hold in a
small open economy. Section 7 contains a summary and some conclusions.
2 Outline of the model
We analyse the impact of temporary agency work on trade union wage setting using
two modelling frameworks: the main variant focuses on the partial equilibrium in a closed
economy with monopolistic competition in goods markets, whereas Section 6 explains how
the main model equations have to be modiﬁed in order to describe the general equilibrium
in a small open economy where goods prices are determined by world markets.
The following outline of the model is based on the modelling framework for the closed
economy. There are two types of agents in the economy: Besides workers, who supply
labour and do not own capital, there are also capitalists, who own the ﬁrms and do
not supply labour. There also exist two types of ﬁrms in the economy: Productive
ﬁrms produce ﬁnal goods by using regular workers and possibly also temporary agency
workers in production. Temporary work agencies lend temporary workers to productive
ﬁrms. Between productive ﬁrms monopolistic competition prevails in the goods market.
Because of barriers to market entry (that are, for simplicity, not explicitly modelled) the
number of productive ﬁrms is given and monopoly rents are earned in the goods market.
Firm-level trade unions determine wages on behalf of employed regular workers and try
to appropriate some share of the rents for their members. Agency workers, however, are
not covered by trade unions’ wage agreements.
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Our model belongs to the class of so-called “right-to-manage” models, in which ﬁrms
retain the right to choose the employment level. In contrast, in an “eﬃcient bargaining”
model ﬁrms and trade unions bargain over both, wages and employment. Whereas in the
ﬁrst class of models the equilibrium lies on the labour demand curve, in the latter case
the bargaining outcome lies on a contract curve which usually is diﬀerent from the labour
demand curve. Since the implications of these model classes may be quite diﬀerent,
our decision to base the analysis on the right-to-manage model is justiﬁed in detail in
Appendix A.1. Our model consists of the following core elements:
i) Productive firms. The technology of the representative productive ﬁrm is described
by the following production function
Y = Sα1 S
β
2 α + β ≤ 1, (1)
where S1 denotes the segment (intermediate) that can be solely produced by regular work-
ers L1, whereas segment S2 can be produced by regular workers L2 and/or by temporary
workers L˜2. It is assumed that
S1 = L1 (2)
S2 = L2 + δL˜2 0 < δ ≤ 1. (3)
Temporary workers might be less productive than regular workers, in which case δ < 1
holds. Thus, δL˜2 as well as L1 and L2 may be interpreted as labour in “eﬃciency units”,
where in the latter cases productivity is normalized to one. Total regular employment is
L = L1+L2. Notice that, apart from possibly being less productive than regular workers,
temporary workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes for regular workers in some
areas of production. This is a plausible assumption as temporary agency employment is
mainly used in blue collar jobs to replace regular workers doing simple tasks. For example,
regularly employed assemblymen or warehouse workers may be (perfectly) substituted by
temporary agency workers if the latter group can be employed at lower costs.2
2This assumption is also in line with Jahn & Weber (2012) showing that regular jobs are substantially
substituted by temporary jobs.
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The goods demand function for the productive ﬁrm is
Y = p−η Q η > 1, (4)
with p denoting the ﬁrm’s price relative to the aggregate price level and η denoting the
price elasticity of the demand for goods (in absolute values).3 Q is the share of aggregate
demand (being equal to aggregate output) that would accrue to the single ﬁrm if p = 1.
Since the focus of the ﬁrst model variant is on a partial equilibrium model, Q is normalized
to one. If a productive ﬁrm wants to employ a temporary worker, a fee x˜ must be paid
to the temporary work agency. Real proﬁts of the productive ﬁrm are
Π = pY − w(L1 + L2)− xδL˜2, (5)
where w denotes the gross real wage rate for regular workers and x denotes the real fee
per temporary worker in “eﬃciency units”, i.e.
x ≡
x˜
δ
. (6)
In other words, x denotes the costs of producing one unit of S2 if temporary workers are
used for production. Firms compare these costs with the costs w of producing one unit
of S2 using regular workers.
ii) Temporary work agencies. It is assumed that temporary workers are just on the
books of the temporary work agency when they are “idle”, i.e. agency workers only receive
a payment by the temporary work agency when they are assigned to a job at a client ﬁrm.
This assumption captures quite well the institutional framework for temporary work in
the UK, and to some extent the Netherlands or France, to name only some examples.
In other countries, such as Germany and Sweden, temporary workers get an employment
contract and obtain wage payments by the temporary work agency even when they are
3This isoelastic goods demand function of the Blanchard & Kiyotaki (1987) type is often used in the
literature and can be derived from Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) preferences.
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not assigned to a client ﬁrm.4 However, as pointed out by Kvasnicka (2003), hirings by
temporary work agencies occur primarily on-call as a reaction to current client demand to
avoid the risk of initial prolonged unproductive employment of workers. In other words,
the ﬁrst assignment of a worker at a client ﬁrm almost always coincides with the moment
the worker is hired by the temporary work agency, whereas activities such as screening
take place prior to hiring. Our assumption therefore seems to be appropriate for the
analysis of temporary work in a static model as it is considered in this paper.
It is assumed that the proﬁts of a temporary work agency are equal to (x˜− ω− s)L˜2,
where ω denotes the gross real wage rate of the temporary worker and s denotes real
screening and search costs implied by the hiring of the temporary worker. Parameter s
may also be related to the degree of regulation of temporary agency work. For example, in
Germany a temporary worker was only allowed to work for a limited duration at the same
client ﬁrm before the implementation of the Hartz reforms. Hence, in case the client ﬁrm
intended to employ a temporary agency worker for a longer duration, the temporary work
agency had to ﬁnd a new temporary worker for the same job, implying higher screening
and hiring costs.
Moreover, it is assumed that there is free market entry reﬂecting the fact that the
establishment of a temporary work agency does not imply large irreversible investments
as is the case for most productive ﬁrms. Since in equilibrium zero proﬁts prevail, it must
hold that5
x˜ = ω + s. (7)
4The latter case has been analysed in the matching models of Neugart & Storrie (2006) and Baumann
et al. (2011). Alternatively, Neugart & Storrie (2006) also analysed a model variant where workers are just
on the books of the temporary work agency, which did not affect their main results (see their footnote 8).
5The assumption of free market entry is not appropriate for countries in which the establishment of a
temporary work agency is restricted by government regulation. In that case eq. (7) should be interpreted
as a simple shortcut to capture the fact that the fee x˜ claimed by the temporary work agency is positively
related to screening costs s and the wage rate ω of a temporary worker.
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iv) Temporary workers. Following the matching models of Neugart & Storrie (2006)
and Baumann et al. (2011), we assume that agencies are able to set the wage ω equal
to the reservation wage of workers. The temporary work agency therefore oﬀers a wage
making its workers at the margin indiﬀerent to either being hired by the agency or staying
unemployed. This assumption captures the fact that in many countries agency workers
have a very weak bargaining position.6 From the aforementioned matching models it is
known that the payment of temporary workers may be lower than, equal to or greater
than unemployment beneﬁts depending on whether temporary workers ﬁnd regular jobs
more likely than unemployed workers or not (see eqs. (16) and (17) in Baumann et al.,
2011). We assume that the temporary work agency oﬀers a gross real wage ω so that the
net real wage ωn equals net unemployment beneﬁts bn. Implicitly, it is therefore assumed
that the job ﬁnding probability is the same for unemployed and temporary workers. Net
wages and beneﬁts are deﬁned as ωn ≡ (1 − τw)ω and bn ≡ (1 − τb)b, where τw and τb
denote the tax rate for wages and beneﬁts, respectively. Hence, it is taken into account
that in many countries unemployment beneﬁts are also subject to income taxation. As
in Beissinger & Egger (2004), we consider a situation in which (1− τb) = φ(1− τw), with
φ ≥ 1. The government often imposes a lower tax burden on unemployment beneﬁts
implying φ > 1, whereas if taxes on wages and unemployment beneﬁts are the same,
φ = 1. The assumption ωn = bn then implies
ω = φb with φ ≥ 1. (8)
iii) Trade unions. It is assumed that all employed regular workers are union members.
Firm-level trade unions determine the wage for regular workers by maximising the rent
accruing to their members.7 The rent of a single union member equals the diﬀerential
6This is, for example, pointed out in Eurofound (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions) (2008). According to this study, research findings also suggest that agency
workers may have limited knowledge of their rights or the means to apply them.
7We consider a monopoly union model instead of a bargaining model in order to keep the analysis as
simple as possible.
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between the net wage at the respective ﬁrm and the net income obtained as outside
option. For the determination of the outside option it must be taken into account that
a regular worker being dismissed by the ﬁrm under consideration may either end up as a
unemployed worker or ﬁnd a job as a temporary worker. However, because of eq. (8), the
net wage of a temporary worker equals net unemployment beneﬁts. As a consequence,
the outside option of a regular worker simply amounts to net unemployment beneﬁts.
The utility function of the representative union is the rent of a single worker times the
number of regular workers at the ﬁrm under consideration, i.e. U = L(wn − bn), where
wn ≡ (1−τw)w denotes the net real wage of regular workers. Because (1−τb) = φ(1−τw)
the trade union utility function can be rewritten as
U = L (1− τw) (w − φb), with φ ≥ 1. (9)
v) Government budget constraint. The tax receipts of the government are solely
used to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts, hence in the case of a balanced budget
τww(L1 + L2) + τwωL˜2 = (1− τb) b [1− L1 − L2 − L˜2]. (10)
The government may determine the level of net unemployment beneﬁts by choosing τb
and b. From the condition for a balanced budget then tax rate τw follows.
vi) Solution of the model. In the model, the agents’ decisions are taken in two stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, the trade union determines the wage level for regular workers and the
temporary work agency determines the fee it claims for the employment of an agency
worker at a client ﬁrm. Because of the zero proﬁt condition for temporary work agencies
in eq. (7), the earnings equation (8) for agency workers, and eq. (6), the fee for an agency
worker (in eﬃciency units) simply is x = (φb+ s)/δ. In the second stage, the ﬁrm decides
on whether to use temporary workers or not and also determines the employment levels
of regular workers and (possibly) temporary workers. This is taken into account by the
trade union in the determination of the wage level. In order to obtain a subgame perfect
equilibrium, the two-stage game must be solved by backward induction. Notice that the
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ﬁrm’s decision to employ temporary workers can be made quite “spontaneously” and can
be easily reversed, since it does not require irreversible investment decisions. Hence, it is
quite natural to assume that trade union wages are determined before the ﬁrm decides
on the use of temporary agency workers and not the other way round.
3 The determination of labour demand
In stage 2, each productive ﬁrm chooses the number of regular and temporary workers.
The fee x to be paid to the temporary employment agency for a temporary worker (in
eﬃciency units) and the wage rate w for a regular worker are already determined (from
stage 1). Inserting eqs. (1) to (4) into eq. (5), the proﬁt maximisation problem of the
representative ﬁrm is8
max
L1,L2,L˜2
pi = Lακ1 (L2 + δL˜2)
βκ − w(L1 + L2)− xδL˜2 s.t.  L2 ≥ 0, L˜2 ≥ 0, (11)
where the parameter κ is deﬁned as κ ≡ (η − 1)/η, with 0 < κ < 1. The lower κ, the
higher the monopoly power of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst–order conditions are:
∂pi
∂L1
= ακLακ−11 (L2 + δL˜2)
βκ − w = 0
∂pi
∂L2
= βκLακ1 (L2 + δL˜2)
βκ−1 − w ≤ 0, L2 ≥ 0,
∂pi
∂L2
L2 = 0
∂pi
∂L˜2
= βκLακ1 (L2 + δL˜2)
βκ−1 − x ≤ 0, L˜2 ≥ 0,
∂pi
∂L˜2
L˜2 = 0.
It follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions that three cases can be distinguished depending
on whether the wage rate w for regular workers is lower than, equal to, or higher than
the costs x of temporary workers.
8Because of eq. (1), both segments are essential for production. The corresponding labour input
conditions L1 > 0 and L2 + L˜2 > 0 are not explicitly taken into account in eq. (11).
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Case I: w < x.
If w < x, it is cheaper to employ only regular workers, hence L2 > 0 and L˜2 = 0. From
the ﬁrst-order conditions the following labour demand functions are obtained:
L1 = L1(w) = A1 · w
−1/[1−κ(α+β)] (12)
L2 = L2(w) = A2 · w
−1/[1−κ(α+β)], (13)
with
A1 ≡ [(ακ)
1−βκ · (βκ)βκ]1/[1−κ(α+β)] and A2 ≡ [(ακ)
ακ · (βκ)1−ακ]1/[1−κ(α+β)]. (14)
Therefore, total labour demand L for regular workers is given by
L = Lr(w) = (A1 + A2)w
−1/[1−κ(α+β)], (15)
where the index r denotes the situation in which only regular workers are employed. The
wage elasticity of labour demand (in absolute values), denoted as εr, is
εr =
1
1− κ(α + β)
. (16)
Case II: w = x.
This situation describes the borderline case in which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between em-
ploying regular workers and temporary workers in the production of S2. The number of
regular workers in the production of S2 could therefore vary between 0 and L2(x), where
L2(x) denotes the labour demand function L2(w) from eq. (13) evaluated at w = x. For
ease of exposition we assume that the ﬁrm only employs regular workers if w = x.9 Hence,
in case II the same labour demand demand function for regular workers as in eq. (15)
(evaluated at w = x) results, i.e.
L = Lr(x) = (A1 + A2) x
−1/[1−κ(α+β)]. (17)
9This behaviour would result if the trade union claimed a wage w that is marginally lower than x.
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Case III: w > x.
In this case, proﬁts are maximised by using only temporary workers in the production of
S2, hence L2 = 0 and L˜2 > 0. The labour demand functions are:
L1 = L1(w, x) = A1
[
w−(1−βκ) x−βκ
]1/[1−κ(α+β)]
L˜2 = L˜2(w, x) = (1/δ)A2
[
w−ακ x−(1−ακ)
]1/[1−κ(α+β)]
, (18)
with A1 and A2 being deﬁned as in case I, see eq. (14). Total labour demand for regular
workers in case III equals L1, i.e.
L = Lt(w, x) = A1
[
w−(1−βκ) x−βκ
]1/[1−κ(α+β)]
, (19)
where the index t denotes the situation in which only temporary workers are employed
in the production of S2. In this case, the demand for regular workers also depends on
the fee for temporary workers because of the complementarities in production between
segments S1 and S2. For example, if the number of temporary workers in the production
of S2 is reduced because these workers become more expensive, the demand for regular
workers in the production of S1 is reduced as well. The wage elasticity of labour demand
for regular workers (in absolute values) now becomes
εt =
(1− βκ)
1− κ(α + β)
. (20)
Notice that both labour demand elasticities, εr and εt, are constant and greater than
one. Moreover, notice that εt < εr holds. If temporary workers are employed as well, the
labour demand elasticity for regular workers gets smaller (in absolute values) because of
the decline in the share of regular employment in total costs.
4 Union wage determination for regular workers
In stage 1, trade unions choose the wage that maximises the economic rent for employed
regular members, deﬁned in eq. (9), taking into account that employment is determined
by ﬁrms in stage 2. Whether ﬁrms use temporary workers or not depends on the size of
11
the fee for temporary workers relative to the wage that has to be paid to regular workers.
Segment S2 is produced by regular workers if w ≤ x, whereas it is produced by temporary
workers if w > x. Since trade unions determine the wage w for regular workers, their
actions also aﬀect the employment level chosen by ﬁrms.
In the following analysis it will turn out that there exist three wage-setting regimes,
denoted as regimes R, X and T , respectively. In regime R, the representative trade union
claims the wage wR, deﬁned as the monopoly wage if the labour demand function is Lr(w),
and the corresponding ﬁrm chooses the employment level Lr(wR). In regime X , the trade
union ﬁnds it optimal to set a wage wX = x that equals the fee for temporary workers and
the employment level is Lr(x). In regime T , the trade union claims the wage wT , deﬁned
as the monopoly wage if the labour demand function is Lt(w, x), and the ﬁrm chooses the
employment level Lt(wT , x). Which regime prevails depends on the fee x for temporary
workers relative to two threshold values x and x, with x < x, as depicted in Figure 1. If
x ≥ x, the trade union will choose the wage-setting regime R. For x < x, the regime T
will be chosen, whereas for intermediate values of the fee, x ≤ x < x, the wage-setting
regime X will be implemented.10
x
x x¯
Regime T
x < x
w = wT
L2 = 0; L˜2 > 0
Regime X
x ≤ x < x
w = wX = x
L2 > 0; L˜2 = 0
Regime R
x ≤ x
w = wR
L2 > 0; L˜2 = 0
Figure 1: Three wage-setting regimes for regular workers depending on the
size of the fee for temporary workers
Before moving on to prove these statements, the monopoly wages and corresponding
10Notice that in the wage-setting regimes R and X only regular workers are employed, i.e. the firm
chooses the employment level according to the Lr(w) function. The indices r and t just distinguish the
labour demand functions and have a different meaning than the indices for the wage-setting regimes R,
X and T .
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employment and utility levels for the regimes R and T are derived. As shown in Ap-
pendix A.2, in these regimes each union sets the wage for regular workers as a mark-up
over unemployment beneﬁts, with the mark-up depending negatively on the wage elas-
ticity of labour demand for regular workers. As has been shown in Section 3, the labour
demand elasticities diﬀer depending on whether the ﬁrm uses only regular workers or also
temporary workers in production. In regime R, the rent-maximising wage for regular
workers claimed by the trade union is
wR =
1
(α + β)κ
φb, (21)
leading to the employment level Lr(wR) determined by eq. (15). The trade union then
achieves the utility level
VR = Lr(wR) (1− τw) (wR − φb). (22)
In regime T , the rent-maximising wage for regular workers becomes
wT =
1− βκ
ακ
φb, (23)
leading to the employment level Lt(wT , x) determined by eq. (19). Interestingly, it turns
out that wT > wR. If the ﬁrm uses temporary agency work, the union’s wage claim for the
remaining regular workers is higher than the rent-maximising wage if only regular workers
are employed. The reason is that the labour demand elasticity for regular workers is lower
(in absolute values) if also temporary workers are employed. In regime T , the trade union
achieves the economic rent
VT (x) = Lt(wT , x) (1− τw) (wT − φb). (24)
As can be seen from this equation, the monopoly rent in regime T is a function of the fee
for temporary workers. While wT is constant, labour demand Lt(·) for regular workers
negatively depends on the fee x. As a consequence, VT also negatively depends on x.
An intuition for the determination of the threshold values x and x and the separation
of the diﬀerent wage-setting regimes is most easily obtained by looking at Figure 2 that
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describes the labour market for regular workers. The curve Lr(w) represents labour
demand in case only regular workers are employed in the production of both segments,
whereas Lt(w, x) is the labour demand curve (for regular workers) if temporary workers
are used for the production of the S2-segment. Notice that a decline in x leads to a
rightward shift of the Lt-curve.
If x ≥ wR, i.e. the fee for temporary workers is higher than or equal to the wage wR,
the trade union chooses the wage w = wR that maximises its economic rent if only regular
workers are employed, and the ﬁrm decides to employ only regular workers (point A). The
upper threshold for x therefore is
x ≡ wR =
1
(α + β)κ
φb. (25)
L
w
Lt(w, x) Lr(w)Lt(w, x)
VT (x) = VX(x)
E
B
VR
A
VX(x)
VT (x)
wT
Lt(wT , x)
wR = x
Dx
Lr(x)
CwX = x
Figure 2: The determination of the threshold values x and x
Now suppose that the fee x for temporary workers is somewhat below x. If the trade
union still claimed the wage wR, the ﬁrm would decide to employ temporary workers for
the production of S2, because x < wR. In Figure 2, the corresponding labour demand
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curve (for regular workers) is depicted as the dashed line Lt(w, x). If the trade union
chooses a wage rate w > x, the ﬁrm chooses employment according to this Lt(w, x)–curve.
Along this curve, the rent-maximising wage is given by wT , leading to the employment
level Lt(wT , x) (point B). As is evident from the ﬁgure, in this situation the trade union
would be better oﬀ by instead choosing a wage wX = x that makes the ﬁrm to employ
only regular workers (point C). The reason is that the corresponding economic rent
VX(x) = Lr(x)(1− τw)(x− φb) (26)
is higher than the utility level VT (x) corresponding to the indiﬀerence curve tangent to
the Lt(w, x)-curve in point B.
If the fee for temporary workers further declines, the Lt(w, x)-curve and the indiﬀer-
ence curve representing the maximum level of economic rent in regime T shift to the right
due to the complementarities in production mentioned in Section 3. Simultaneously, with
decreasing x the economic rent achievable in regime X declines and the corresponding
indiﬀerence curve shifts to the left. As depicted in Figure 2, there has to exist a lower
threshold x deﬁned as the wage level for regular workers that renders the trade union
indiﬀerent between the situation in which only regular workers are used (point D) and
the situation in which temporary workers replace regular workers in the production of seg-
ment S2 (point E). The labour demand curve in the latter situation is given by Lt(w, x).
Hence, x is implicitly deﬁned by the condition
VT (x) = VX(x). (27)
If x < x, the Lt(w, x)-curve lies to the right of the Lt(w, x)-curve. Hence, it no longer
pays oﬀ for the trade union to prevent the employment of temporary workers because in
this case VX(x) < VT (x).
The graphical analysis using Figure 2 suggests that a lower threshold x < x exists,
where x = wR. Since the graphical results depend on the position of the Lt(w, x)-curves
relative to the Lr(w)-curve, we have to make sure that the graphical intuition is correct.
The formal proof, outlined in more detail in Appendix A.3, is based on the following
reasoning:
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1. To determine the upper threshold x, it is shown that for all values of the fee x
with x ≥ wR it is optimal for the trade union to claim the wage w = wR. The alternative
strategy of choosing a wage w > x, thereby inducing the ﬁrm to employ temporary
workers for the production of segment S2, is not in the interest of the trade union.
11 This
is demonstrated by noting that for x = wR it holds that VR > VT (wR). In other words,
the wage-employment combination (wR, Lr(wR)) leads to a higher economic rent than the
combination (wT , Lt(wT , x = wR)). Moreover, because ∂VT (x)/∂x < 0, it must also hold
that VR > VT (x) for all x > wR. It can be concluded that for x ≥ wR, the R-regime
prevails in which it is the best strategy for the trade union to claim the wage wR, and for
the ﬁrm to employ only regular workers.
2. It has already been noted in step 1 that VR > VT (wR). Because of eqs. (22) and (26),
it also holds that VR = VX(wR). It can therefore be concluded that VX(wR)−VT (wR) > 0.
Moreover, it can be shown that ∂[VX(x) − VT (x)]/∂x > 0 for x ≤ wR. In other words,
the diﬀerence between the economic rents in regimes X and T declines with a decline in
x. However, at least for marginal declines in x, it still holds that VX(x) > VT (x). This
means that if x (marginally) declines below wR, it is better to set the wage equal to the
fee of temporary workers (X-regime) in order to prevent temporary agency employment
(T -regime). From points 1. and 2. it follows that x = wR indeed constitutes the upper
threshold for the fee x. For x ≥ x the R-regime prevails, whereas for (at least marginally)
lower values than x the X-regime is chosen.
3. Since VX(wR) − VT (wR) > 0 and ∂[VX(x) − VT (x)]/∂x > 0 for x ≤ wR, with
declining x eventually a level x is reached where VX(x) = VT (x). If x were lower than the
lowest admissible value of fee x, denoted xmin and deﬁned as xmin = φb, regime T would
never occur.12 However, it is shown that xmin < x and VX(x)− VT (x) < 0 for all x with
xmin ≤ x < x. Hence, x constitutes the lower threshold separating regimes X and T .
11Note that for fees x > wR it can never be optimal to choose a wage w with wR < w < x, because wR
is the rent-maximising wage if only regular workers are employed.
12As has been outlined in Section 2, x = (φ b + s)/δ. The minimum value for x is obtained for δ = 1
and s = 0, leading to xmin = φb.
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5 Comparison of the different wage setting regimes
This section compares the levels of wages, employment, trade union’s utilities and ﬁrm’s
proﬁts for the three wage-setting regimes deﬁned in Section 4. Starting with the compar-
ison of wage levels, it immediately follows from the discussion in Section 4 that
wT > wR > wX , (28)
where wX represents all wages wX = x for x ∈ [x, x). The ﬁrst inequality is due the
lower wage elasticity of labour demand for regular workers in regime T in comparison
to regime R. Hence, in the employment regime with temporary workers, the optimal
wage wT is higher than the monopoly wage wR when only regular workers are employed.
The second inequality results from unions’ incentive to undercut the wage wR to prevent
temporary agency employment if x ≤ x < x.
Regarding trade union utility, it follows from the determination of the threshold values
x and x in Section 4 that
VR > VX(x) > VT (x) for x > x. (29)
From that discussion it is also evident that VT (x) > VX(x) if x < x and that VT (x)
increases with declining x. An interesting question left to answer is whether for values of
x with xmin < x < x it could be possible that VT (x) > VR. This would mean that trade
unions proﬁt from the employment of (relatively cheap) temporary workers because of
higher economic rents. However, in Appendix A.4 it is shown that, at least in our model,
this result cannot occur. Instead, we conclude that
VR > VT (x) for x ≥ xmin = φ b. (30)
Hence, trade unions are always harmed by the employment of temporary workers.
Since in regimes R and X the same labour demand function is relevant and wX <
wR, it immediately follows that employment in regime X is higher than employment in
regime R. Moreover, it also holds that employment in regime R is higher than employment
in regime T . If this were not the case, we would get a situation in which both wages and
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employment of regular workers are higher in regime T than in regime R. This, however,
would contradict the inequality in eq. (30). Therefore,
Lr(wX) > Lr(wR) > Lt(wT , x), (31)
where wX again refers to wages wX = x in the interval x ∈ [x, x) that are chosen in
regime X . Note that the second inequality not only holds for x ∈ [xmin, x), but for all
x ≥ xmin. In Appendix A.5 it is explicitly shown that inequality (31) holds.
Finally, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in the diﬀerent regimes are considered (for details see Ap-
pendix A.5). It can easily be derived that piX(x) > piT (x) and piX(x) > piR for all x ≥ xmin.
However, whether proﬁts in regime T exceed proﬁts in regime R or vice versa, depends
on the values of the exogenous parameters α, β, and κ. In Appendix A.5 it is shown that
there exists a value x > xmin, denoted xindiff, for which piR = piT (xindiff). The location
of xindiff depends on the parameter values of α, β, and κ. If xindiff ∈ [x, x), proﬁts in
regime T are higher than in regime R, i.e. it then holds that piT (x) > piR for x ∈ [xmin, x).
It can be shown that the probability for this situation is the higher, the smaller κ and
the higher β relative to α. In other words, the larger the share of segment S2 in produc-
tion and the higher its share in total labour costs, the higher is the incentive of ﬁrms to
hire temporary agency workers in the production of that segment to reduce labour costs
and increase proﬁts. However, if xindiff ∈ [xmin, x), there is a range of fees for temporary
workers (xindiff, x) for which piT (x) < piR. It may seem puzzling that ﬁrms would employ
temporary workers in such a situation though this implies lower proﬁts than in the regime
where only regular workers are employed (at the monopoly wage wR). The explanation
is as follows:
According to our analysis, the trade union ﬁnds it no longer proﬁtable to prevent
temporary agency employment if x < x. The trade union therefore demands a wage wT
for the remaining regular workers and the ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to replace regular workers in
segment S2 by temporary workers. Both, the ﬁrm and the trade union, would be better oﬀ
if the ﬁrm would only employ regular workers in both segments at the monopoly wage wR.
However, if the trade union claims the wage wR, the ﬁrm still has the incentive to deviate
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from such an agreement and to replace the regular workers in segment S2 by temporary
workers, since x < x < wR. In such a case, the trade union would be even worse oﬀ than
in a situation in which it claims the higher wage wT for the remaining regular workers.
6 A model variant for a small open economy
The model outlined above also describes the general equilibrium for a small open econ-
omy. In a small open economy goods prices are determined in world markets. Since the
representative ﬁrm faces an inﬁnitely elastic demand curve at world prices, the param-
eter κ introduced in eq. (11) equals 1. To obtain well deﬁned labour demand functions
it must be assumed that α + β < 1 in eq. (1). Instead of eqs. (16) and (20), the labour
demand elasticities now become
εr =
1
1− (α + β)
and εt =
1− β
1− (α+ β)
With these labour demand elasticities, the monopoly wages in regimes R and T can be
computed as
wR =
1
α + β
φb and wT =
1− β
α
φb, (32)
where again wT > wR holds. The rest of the analysis remains unchanged, i.e. there
exist again the three regimes R, X and T separated by the threshold values x and x as
outlined in the closed economy version of the model. Therefore, our conclusions also hold
in a general equilibrium setting for a small open economy.
7 Summary and conclusions
This paper develops a theoretical model to analyse how the ﬁrms’ option to employ tem-
porary agency workers aﬀects the wage-setting behaviour of trade unions. In the model,
the motive behind employing temporary agency workers is the reduction in costs when
the fee for temporary workers is lower than the wage for regular workers. The theoreti-
cal predictions are derived using two modelling frameworks: the partial equilibrium in a
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closed economy with monopolistic competition in goods markets and the general equilib-
rium in a small open economy where goods prices are determined by world markets. For
simplicity, in our model monopoly unions are assumed that by their very nature have the
highest wage-setting power.
It is shown that, depending on the fee for temporary workers, unions may try to
prevent the implementation of temporary agency work by deviating from the monopoly
wage and accepting lower wages. In this case, ﬁrms are able to use the option to replace
regular workers by temporary workers as a threat against unions, thereby lowering wage
demands and increasing proﬁts. Unions then only claim wages that are equal to the fee
the ﬁrm would have to pay for temporary workers. As a consequence, the ﬁrms’ option
to use agency workers may aﬀect wage setting also in those ﬁrms that do not employ
temporary agency workers. This is an important result for at least two reasons. First,
empirical studies may come to wrong conclusions if they try to identify the wage eﬀects
of temporary agency work by comparing wage levels for regular workers in ﬁrms with and
without temporary agency work. Second, though the share of agency workers in the total
workforce is relatively small in many OECD countries, the impact of temporary agency
work on the wage-setting process may be much larger.
It is also shown that if the fee for temporary workers is below a speciﬁc lower thresh-
old, it is no longer the optimal strategy for trade unions to prevent the employment of
temporary agency workers. Interestingly, since ﬁrms reduce the number of regular work-
ers, it now is the best strategy for unions to claim wages that are even higher than the
wage demands when the ﬁrms’ threat to replace regular workers is not credible. Hence,
according to our model, the intensive use of temporary agency workers in high-wage ﬁrms
may be the cause and not the consequence of the high wage level in those ﬁrms.
In the literature it is sometimes argued that the use of temporary agency work may
also beneﬁt trade unions because they would be able to appropriate higher economic rents.
It would then be in the interest of unions not to resist the employment of agency workers.
However, at least in our theoretical model, trade unions are always harmed by the ﬁrms’
option to employ temporary workers.
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A Appendix
A.1 Right to manage versus efficient bargaining
Empirical studies lack a clear answer about whether the right-to-manage model or the
eﬃcient bargaining model is more relevant. If managers are asked about the issues covered
in bargains with trade unions, the answers seem to unambiguously back up the right-to-
manage model (Booth, 1995). This can be most clearly seen in the USA, where many
collective agreements explicitly stipulate that employers retain the right to determine the
level of employment. Even in countries where such a stipulation is not explicitly found in
employment contracts, one gets the impression that trade unions typically do not bargain
over employment.
Some economists argued that bargaining over employment implicitly occurs through
ﬁrm-union agreements on “manning” levels (by which capital-to-labour or labour-to-
output ratios are meant).13 However, it is not clear why agreements on manning lev-
els should be interpreted as contracts which implicitly determine the employment level.
The reason is that, for instance, a ﬁxed capital-labour ratio does not prevent ﬁrms from
adjusting both capital and employment, or changing the number of shifts per machine
(Layard et al., 1991, p. 96).
It is sometimes claimed that empirical studies which do not rely on survey data but
focus on market outcomes would support the hypothesis that eﬃcient bargains do, at least
implicitly, occur (see, for example, Brown & Ashenfelter, 1986). However, Booth (1995,
chap. 5) convincingly argues that the tests applied in these studies in order to distin-
guish between the right-to-manage model and the eﬃcient bargaining model are ﬂawed
and therefore not credible. Empirical studies trying to identify the appropriate bargain-
ing model from observed market outcomes are confronted with almost unsurmountable
diﬃculties. In principle, each study has to make assumptions about trade unions’ pref-
erences, technologies, other labour market imperfections, and the market structure. The
13For this discussion see, for instance, McDonald & Solow (1981), Johnson (1990) and Clark (1990).
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empirical tests then are joint tests of these assumptions. For example, the shape of the
contract curve depends on the preferences of union members and may even coincide with
the labour demand curve.14 Hence, even if one focuses on the eﬃcient bargaining model,
diﬀerent results are possible depending on trade union’s preferences. The critique goes far-
ther than that, since empirical studies have failed to signiﬁcantly improve our knowledge
about trade unions’ preferences (see, for example, Pencavel, 1991).
The fact that eﬃcient bargains are not observed more frequently may be due to the
fact that something important is missing in theoretical considerations which claim the
superiority of wage-employment bargains. For instance, eﬃcient bargains may not be
enforceable. Since the bargaining outcome usually lies oﬀ the labour demand curve, the
ﬁrm has an incentive to cheat and may try to increase proﬁts at the bargained wage level
by choosing employment according to its labour demand curve. If trade unions are unable
to enforce the labour contract, they may prefer higher wages and lower employment as
predicted by the right-to-manage model.15 For all these reasons, we consider the right-
to-manage model to be a plausible framework for studying the impact of trade unions on
labour market outcomes.
A.2 Utility maximisation of the trade union
In the wage-setting regimes R and T , the representative trade union chooses the optimal
wage wR and wT by maximising its objective function (9) subject to the labour demand
function Lr(w) or Lt(w, x) deﬁned in eqs. (15) and (19), respectively. From the ﬁrst-order
condition it follows that
−
∂Lr
∂w
wR
Lr
=
wR
wR − φ b
and −
∂Lt
∂w
wT
Lt
=
wT
wT − φ b
14See, for example, the “insider model” of Carruth & Oswald (1987) and the “seniority wage model”
of Oswald (1993).
15If uncertainty and asymmetric information with respect to the future level of the firm’s goods demand
are taken into account, the scope of incentive-compatible contracts may be severely limited due to the
costs of information gathering and the problems associated with moral hazard.
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for the R-regime and T -regime, respectively. Therefore,
wR =
εr
εr − 1
φ b and wT =
εt
εt − 1
φ b,
where εr and εt are deﬁned in eqs. (16) and (20), respectively. If the tax rate for unem-
ployment beneﬁts is lower than that for wages, φ > 1 holds, whereas φ = 1 if the tax
rate for unemployment beneﬁts and wages is the same. In the case of the R-regime, the
second-order condition for a utility maximum is
(1− τw)
[
(wR − φ b) ·
∂2Lr
∂w2
∣∣∣∣
w=wR
+ 2 ·
∂Lr
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wR
]
< 0.
Since
∂Lr
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wR
= −εr ·
Lr(wR)
wR
, and
∂2Lr
∂w2
∣∣∣∣
w=wR
=
εr
w2R
· Lr(wR) · (1 + εr),
it can be shown that the second-order condition for a the utility maximum holds because
−Lr ·
εr
w2R
· φ b < 0.
A similar reasoning applies to the second-order condition in the T -regime.
A.3 Determination of the wage-setting regimes
This appendix provides the details for the proof outlined in Section 4.
1. It is ﬁrst shown that VR > VT (wR). Inserting the labour demand function Lr(·)
from eq. (15) into the expression for VR in eq. (22), one obtains
VR = (A1 + A2)w
−1
1−κ(α+β)
R (1− τw)(wR − φb).
Similarly, inserting Lt(·) from eq. (19) into the expression for VT in eq. (24) for x = wR
leads to
VT (wT ) = A1[w
−(1−βκ)
T w
−βκ
R ]
1
1−κ(α+β) (1− τw)(wT − φb).
Hence, for VR > VT (wR) it must hold that
A1
A1 + A2
·
wT − φb
wR − φb
<
[
w−1R
w
−(1−βκ)
T w
−βκ
R
] 1
1−κ(α+β)
. (33)
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Because of the deﬁnition of A1 and A2 in eq. (14) and the deﬁnitions of wR and wT in
eqs. (21) and (23), the LHS of this inequality is
A1
A1 + A2
·
wT − φb
wR − φb
=
α
α + β
·
α+ β
α
= 1. (34)
Hence, inequality (33) becomes
1 <
[
wT
wR
] 1−βκ
1−κ(α+β)
,
leading to wT > wR. Since the last inequality is true, also VR > VT (wR) holds.
As next step the derivative of VT (x) is computed. One obtains
∂VT (x)
∂x
= −
βκ
1− κ(α + β)
VT (x)
x
< 0
If these results are taken together, it can be concluded that for all fees x ≥ wR, the R-
regime prevails in which it is the best strategy for the trade union to claim the wage wR,
and for the ﬁrm to employ only regular workers.
2. Using eqs. (24) and (26) for VT and VX , respectively, and taking account of the
labour demand functions (17) and (19), the diﬀerence in the rents achievable in regimes X
and T is
VX(x)− VT (x) = (1− τw)·[
(A1 + A2) x
−
1
1−κ(α+β) (x− φb)− A1 [x
−βκw
−(1−βκ)
T ]
1
1−κ(α+β) (wT − φb)
]
,
and its derivative with respect to fee x is
∂[VX(x)− VT (x)]
∂x
= (1− τw)·[
(A1 + A2)x
−
1
1−κ(α+β)
(
1−
1
1− κ(α + β)
x− φb
x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C
+
βκ
1− κ(α + β)
A1 (x
−βκw
−(1−βκ)
T )
1
1−κ(α+β)x−1(wT − φb)
]
The term C is positive if
x <
1
κ(α+ β)
φb = wR,
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and it is zero if x = wR. Hence, x ≤ wR is suﬃcient for ∂[VX(x)−VT (x)]/∂x > 0 to hold.
As has been explained in Section 4, it follows from points 1 and 2 that x = wR indeed
constitutes the upper threshold for the fee x. For x ≥ x the R-regime prevails, whereas
for (at least marginally) lower values than x, the X-regime is chosen.
3. Since VX(wR) − VT (wR) > 0 and ∂[VX(x) − VT (x)]/∂x > 0 for x ≤ wR, with
declining x eventually a level x is reached where VX(x) = VT (x), implying
(A1 + A2)x
−1
1−κ(α+β) (x− φ b) = A1
[
w
−(1−βκ)
T x
−βκ
] 1
1−κ(α+β) (wT − φ b).
Rearrangement leads to the following expression which implicitly deﬁnes x:
α
α + β
(
wT
x
) −(1−βκ)
1−κ(α+β)
=
x− φ b
wT − φ b
.
Theoretically, it may be possible that x is lower than the lowest admissible value of fee x,
denoted xmin, where xmin = φb. This would mean regime T never to occur. However, it
can be shown that for xmin the diﬀerence in the utilities in regimes X and T is negative:
VX(xmin)− VT (xmin) = Lr(xmin)(1− τw)(φ b− φ b)− Lt(xmin)(1− τw)(wT − φ b)
= −Lt(xmin)(1− τw)(wT − φ b) < 0.
As ∂[VX(x) − VT (x)]/∂x > 0 and VX(x) − VT (x) = 0, it holds that xmin < x. Hence,
regime T is a possible outcome of the model and x constitutes the lower threshold sepa-
rating regimes X and T .
A.4 Proof for VR > VT (x) for x > xmin
Since VT (x) increases with declining x, it could be the case that for very low x the
inequality VT (x) > VR holds. In terms of Figure 2 this would mean that for a very low
fee x the LT (x)-curve may lie far enough to the right that the corresponding economic
rent in regime T is higher than the economic rent achievable in regime R. However, it
can be shown that in our model such a case cannot occur. To do so, it has to be shown
that the highest achievable economic rent in regime T is lower than the rent achievable in
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regime R. Since ∂VT (x)/∂x < 0, the highest value of VT is obtained at VT (xmin), where
xmin = φ b. In the following, we will show that
VT (xmin) < VR (35)
holds. Taking account of the deﬁnition of the utility functions in eqs. (22) and (24) and
the labour demand functions in eqs. (15) and (19), this condition is met if
A1
A1 + A2
·
wT − φb
wR − φb
<
[
w
(1−βκ)
T (φ b)
βκ
wR
] 1
1−κ(α+β)
. (36)
Because of eq. (34), the LHS of this inequality is equal to one. Taking account of the
deﬁnitions of wR and wT in eqs. (21) and (23), rearrangement of inequality (36) leads to
κ(α + β)
(
1− βκ
ακ
)(1−βκ)
> 1. (37)
To show that this inequality is fulﬁlled, we set α + β = z with z ≤ 1. In the following,
the cases z = 1 and z < 1 are considered separately.
Case 1: z = 1. Since in this case α = 1− β, the LHS of inequality (37) becomes
f := κ
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)1−βκ
(38)
It must be shown that f is greater than one for all admissible values of β and κ. Because
of the sign of the partial derivatives,16
∂f
∂β
= κ2
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)1−βκ[
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
− ln
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)
− 1
]
> 0,
∂f
∂κ
= −
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)1−βκ[
1 + βκ ln
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)]
< 0,
the lowest admissible values of β and the highest admissible values of κmust be considered.
Since it holds that limκ→1 f = 1 and limβ→0 f = 1, f is indeed greater than one for all
admissible values of κ and β. Hence, VR > VT (x) for all admissible values of the fee for
temporary workers (x ≥ xmin) in the case α+ β = 1.
16For the first derivative to be positive, the term in corner brackets has to be positive. In general it holds
that y−ln(y) > 1 for expression y being positive and unequal to one. As expression (1−βκ)/((1−β)κ) > 1,
the term in brackets is indeed positive.
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Case 2: z < 1. Since in this case α = z − β, the LHS of inequality (37) becomes
h := z κ
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)1−βκ
(39)
It must be shown that h is greater than one for all admissible values of β and κ. Because
of the sign of the partial derivatives,
∂h
∂κ
= −κzβ
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)1−βκ
ln
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)
< 0,
∂h
∂β
= zκ2
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)1−βκ[
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
− ln
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)
− 1
]
> 0,
the lowest admissible values of β and the highest admissible values of κmust be considered.
It holds that
lim
κ→1
h = z
(
1− β
z − β
)1−β
.
In order to check whether this expression is still greater than one if β gets very small, we
compute
lim
β→0
(
lim
κ→1
h
)
=
1
z
· z = 1.
Therefore, h is indeed greater than one for all admissible values of κ and β. Hence,
VR > VT (x) for all admissible values of the fee for temporary workers (x ≥ xmin) in the
case α + β < 1.
Taken together, VR > VT (x) for all admissible parameter values and x ≥ xmin.
A.5 Comparison of labour demand and profits in the different
regimes
As has been explained in Section 5, employment in regime X is greater than employment
in regime R because wX < wR. It is now shown that employment in regime R is greater
than employment in regime T . Using eqs. (15), (19), (21), and (23), it turns out that
employment in regime R is greater than that in regime T if(
α
α+ β
)1−κ(α+β)
< κ(α + β)
(
1− βκ
ακ
)(1−βκ)
. (40)
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The RHS of this inequality is greater than one because of inequality (37). Since the LHS
is smaller than one, the condition is met.
Using eqs. (11), (12), (13), (17), (18), and (19), maximum proﬁts in the diﬀerent
regimes are
piR = [A
ακ
1 A
βκ
2 − (A1 + A2)] · w
−
κ(α+β)
1−κ(α+β)
R (41)
piT (x) = [A
ακ
1 A
βκ
2 − (A1 + A2)] · [w
−ακ
T x
−βκ]
1
1−κ(α+β) (42)
piX(x) = [A
ακ
1 A
βκ
2 − (A1 + A2)] · x
−
κ(α+β)
1−κ(α+β) (43)
It is easy to verify that piX(x) > piT (x) and piX(x) > piR for all x ∈ [xmin, x] as for this
range of x it holds that wT > x and wR > x, respectively. However, it is left to show
whether in regime T ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts than in regime R. Using eqs. (41) and
(42), the value of x that renders the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between both regimes, i.e. for which
piR = piT (xindiff), is
xindiff = wR
(
wR
wT
)α
β
(44)
Obviously xindiff < wR, because wR/wT < 1. Furthermore, it can be shown that xindiff is
greater than xmin. For this, using eq. (44) and xmin = φ b, it has to hold that
κ(α+ β)
[
κ(α+ β)
1− βκ
ακ
]α
β
< 1. (45)
Setting α + β = z with z ≤ 1, the LHS of inequality (45) becomes
l := z κ
(
z
1− βκ
z − β
) z−β
β
. (46)
It must be shown that l is smaller than one for all admissible values of β and κ. The
partial derivatives of l are
∂l
∂κ
= z
(
z
1 − βκ
z − β
) z−β
β
·
[
1−
κ(z − β)
1− βκ
]
> 0
and
∂l
∂β
= z κ
(
z
1− βκ
z − β
) z−β
β
·
[
−
z
β2
ln
(
(1− βκ)z
z − β
)
+
(1− βκ)− κ(z − β)
β(1− βκ)
]
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It will turn out that l decreases in β. For this to be the case, the expression in corner
brackets has to be negative, or, alternatively written,
ln
(
(1− βκ)z
z − β
)
−
β(1− βκ)− βκ(z − β)
(1− βκ)z
> 0.
Expanding the second term of the LHS, the inequality can be written as
ln
(
(1− βκ)z
z − β
)
+
z − β
(1− βκ)z
> 1,
which is fulﬁlled because (ln y + 1/y) > 1 for y 6= 1.
As l increases in κ and decreases in β, the highest admissible value of κ and the lowest
admissible value of β must be considered to make sure that inequality (45) is fulﬁlled.
Since the limits are17
lim
κ→1
l = z
(
z
1− β
z − β
) z−β
β
< 1 and lim
β→0
l =
e κ z
eκ z
< 1, (47)
function l is indeed smaller than one for all admissible values of κ and β and, hence, xindiff
is greater than xmin.
It is still left to show where xindiff is located compared to x, i.e. whether xindiff is smaller
than, equal to, or greater than x. This question cannot be answered by just comparing
xindiff and x directly, because x is only implicitly deﬁned. However, Section 4 discussed
that for x ∈ [xmin, x) the economic rent VT (x) exceeds VX(x) whereas for x ∈ [x, x) the
opposite holds. This information can be used to identify the location of xindiff. If for
VT (x) and VX(x) evaluated at xindiff the economic rent in regime T exceeds the rent in
regime X , xindiff lies in the interval [xmin, x). In the opposite case xindiff lies in the interval
[x, x). With the deﬁnitions of VT and VX in eqs. (24) and (26) and the corresponding
labour demand functions (17) and (19), the utility levels are
VX(xindiff) = (A1 + A2)
[(
wR
wT
)α
β
wR
]
−
1
1−κ(α+β)
(1− τw)
[(
wR
wT
)α
β
wR − φb
]
(48)
VT (xindiff) = A1
[
w1−βκT
(
wR
wT
)ακ
wβκR
]
−
1
1−κ(α+β)
(1− τw) [wT − φb] (49)
17Note that for z = 1, limκ→1 l = 1. For z < 1, limκ→1 l ≤ 1 as limβ→0 (limκ→1 l) = e z/e
z ≤ 1.
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Using these equations, it turns out that xindiff ∈ [x, x) or rather VX(xindiff) > VT (xindiff) if

(
wR
wT
)α
β
wR
w
(1−βκ)
T
(
wR
wT
)ακ
wβκR


−
1
1−κ(α+β)
>
A1
A1 + A2
·
wT − φb(
wR
wT
)α
β
wR − φb
. (50)
Because of eq. (34) it holds that A1/(A1 + A2) = α/(α + β) and wT − φb = (wR − φb) ·
(α + β)/α. Therefore, eq. (50) becomes
(
wT
wR
) [1−κ(α+β)]βκ+ακ
[1−κ(α+β)]βκ
>
wR − φb(
wR
wT
)ακ
βκ
wR − φb
. (51)
However, calibration of inequality (51) shows that there are combinations of admissible
parameter values possible for which this inequality is violated. This means that for some
admissible combinations of α, β, and κ it holds that xindiff < x, whereas for other param-
eter combinations xindiff > x. Setting α + β = z with z ≤ 1, it turns out that the smaller
κ and the higher β compared to α, the higher is the probability that xindiff ∈ [x, x).
Whether ﬁrms beneﬁt from using temporary agency employment compared to using
regular workers only, depends on the location of xindiff. For x ∈ [xmin, x), trade unions
claim wage wT and regime T occurs. If, additionally, xindiff ∈ [x, x), then the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt in regime T unambiguously exceeds the proﬁt achievable in regime R. If, however,
xindiff ∈ [xmin, x), there is a range of fees for temporary workers (xindiff, x) for which
piT (x) < piR.
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